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Abstract 
 
Distributed authentication has the property of 
high security compared with existing authentication 
schemes. However, its success ratio for authentication 
may be not high, especially in large-scale Mobile Ad-
Hoc Networks (MANETs). In order to address this 
issue, we propose a hybrid authentication scheme 
which integrates the chained authentication with the 
distributed authentication. When a node can’t find 
enough authentication nodes in its one-hop 
neighborhood to authenticate itself, it requests its 
neighboring nodes to find a certificate chain to do so 
through the chained authentication. Hence, our scheme 
overcomes the drawbacks in terms of success ratio for 
authentication. Theoretical analysis and simulation 
studies show that, compared with the chained 
authentication schemes, our scheme is more scalable 
and it can increase the success ratio for authentication, 
without sacrificing the security requirement. 
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Sharing, Trust Transfer, Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been considerable 
interest in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) with 
the development of wireless communication 
technology. Authentication is one of the most 
important and challenging issues in MANETs. The 
scarcity of computation and communication resources 
and the lack of secure network infrastructures present 
major challenges for deploying applications in such a 
network. 
Many authentication schemes have been proposed 
in the literature based on features of MANETs 
[2][3][5][10][11], which usually employ cryptography 
and secret sharing to achieve security. 
Traditional network authentication solutions 
usually need the support of a trusted third party or 
called a Certificate Authority (CA) [1]. A CA is 
assumed to be responsible for authenticating all the 
nodes in the network, such as Kerberos and X.509 
scheme. However, the centralized server suffers from a 
single point of service denial and compromise. 
As we know, the distributed authentication 
scheme improves security by composing otherwise 
untrustworthy individual nodes into a trustworthy 
aggregation of nodes. The authentication service 
remains available even if some of these nodes have 
been compromised. In the literature, researchers 
attempted to apply the distributed authentication 
scheme into MANETs. Zhou and Hass [2] proposed a 
partially distributed authentication scheme that utilizes 
(n, t) threshold scheme to distribute the key shares of 
the CA over a number of servers. The (n, t) threshold 
scheme allows any t servers out of n servers to recover 
the secret key of the system in a collaborative manner. 
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The n nodes which have the key shares compose a CA, 
among which any t nodes form an effective set. 
Similarly, a mobile adversary has to capture at least t 
nodes in order to crack the secret key of the system and 
it needs to destroy (n-t+1) share holders in order to 
turn off the certification service. This scheme is robust 
against the mobile adversary by using secret division. 
Although this scheme possesses high security, the 
authentication service of distributed scheme is not 
always available in some cases. For example, t 
authentication nodes may not be available in sparse 
areas of the network, thus leading to the failure of 
authentication. 
Kong et al [3] improved the aforementioned 
scheme by proposing a locally distributed 
authentication scheme. All the nodes in the network are 
allocated a partial encryption key and have the right to 
sign the system certificate. When a new node wants to 
join the network, it can find enough trustworthy nodes 
easily within its one-hop neighborhood. It is assumed 
that there are enough nodes in its one-hop 
neighborhood, and each neighbor has a partial key. 
This scheme efficiently improves the scalability of 
authentication and reduces the communication 
overhead among the neighboring nodes during the 
process of authentication. But the security is 
comparatively low, as a mobile adversary just needs to 
capture any t nodes to crack the system secret key. On 
the other hand, as the network becomes large, the 
number of authentication nodes in the network has to 
increase accordingly. It brings troubles in network 
maintenance and management, which restricts the 
scalability of the scheme. 
Capkun et al [4] proposed a self-organized 
authentication system based on public key chain [6]. 
The idea of the public key chain is similar to PGP [7] 
in the sense that both of them form a trust chain by 
collecting the trust information. Each node in the 
network is its own authority and has capability to sign 
and verify the keys of other nodes. In this scheme, 
certificates are issued and stored by the nodes 
themselves, unlike in PGP, where the task is 
implemented by some online servers. Each node 
maintains a local certificate repository that contains a 
few certificates selected by the node according to an 
appropriate algorithm. However, as the capacity of the 
certificate repository is limited, the scheme can’t 
ensure 100% success ratio for authentication. In order 
to increase the success ratio for authentication, each 
node has to store as many certificates as possible, 
which is not feasible in MANETs.  
The authentication schemes in the above 
mentioned papers are just suitable to small or medium-
scale MANETs which consist of tens or at most 
hundreds of mobile nodes in a small area. The 
distributed schemes can’t ensure high service 
availability, and the chained authentication’s 
randomicity makes it not secure enough. In fact, there 
is still very little research on security in large-scale 
MANETs. 
In this paper, we propose a hybrid authentication 
scheme in large-scale MANETs. The role of the CA is 
taken by those network nodes with strong computation 
and communication capabilities. The nodes with 
general capabilities are called normal nodes. The 
proposed scheme can take advantage of high security 
of the distributed authentication schemes and 
effectively hides the mobility of mobile nodes. On the 
other hand, the proposed scheme can achieve high 
success ratio for authentication even in sparse areas by 
utilizing the flexibility of the chained authentication. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, a hybrid authentication scheme is presented. 
We give theoretical analysis and simulation studies 
compared with existing schemes in Section 3. Finally, 
this paper is concluded in Section 4. 
 
2. Hybrid authentication scheme 
 
2.1. Basic Assumptions 
 
We assume that there exist some nodes with 
strong computation and communication capabilities in 
the network. Each node vi in the network has an unique 
identifier IDi and is equipped with a pair of RSA public 
and secret keys {PKi / SKi}. All the nodes in the 
network have some kind of intrusion detection system 
which can efficiently detect the misbehaviors of their 
neighboring nodes. Each node in the network knows 
the system public key SPK, and trusts the certificate 
signed by the system secret key SSK. We assume that a 
mobile adversary can capture at most t-1 nodes within 
a share refreshing period. A legal node in the network 
stores two kinds of certificates: the system certificate 
which is used to validate the node, and the certificate 
which is issued and stored by the node itself to build 
trust relationship with other nodes. If a node u trusts a 
node v in its neighborhood, node u signs a certificate to 
node v. This process repeats until a trusted network is 
formed among the whole network. 
 
2.2. Initialization of the network 
 
We adopt an RSA-based mechanism as the basis 
of our work. The pair of RSA public and secret keys of 
the CA in the system are denoted as SPK/SSK, where 
SPK is the system public key and SSK is the system 
secret key. SSK is used to sign certificates for all the 
nodes in the network. A certificate signed by SSK can 
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be verified by the system public key SPK. Shamir’s 
threshold secret sharing scheme [5] is adapted to divide 
SSK into key shares. N nodes are chosen to act as 
authentication nodes by threshold secret sharing. 
Assume GF(p) is a Galois Field, and a1, a2, …at-1 are 
chosen in GF(p) to form an t-1 polynomial: 
NxaxaxaSSKxf tt mod)(
1
1
2
21
−
−
++++= …  
Then the node’s identifier substitutes x in this 
polynomial to obtain Nvfy ii mod)(=  (i=1,2,…,n)。
According to the property of Galois Field and Lagrange 
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Then we get appending partial secret [8]  
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Each ki is stored by the corresponding node vi 
which we called as the authentication node. Any t 
members of the authentication set can recover the 
secret via Lagrange interpolation. After the network 
initialization phase, the dealer which has disseminated 
partial secret destroys the secret information. 
Each node creates the public key and the 
corresponding secret key by itself, and signs the 
certificates that it trusts. If a node u trusts a node v, and 
believes that a given public key PKv belongs to node v, 
then u issues a public-key certificate in the form of (v, 
PKv, Tissue, Texpire)SK, in which PKv is bound to v by the 
signature of u. Certificates are issued with a limited 
valid time Texpire, and each certificate contains its 
issuing and expiration timestamps. At the beginning, 
each node’s certificate repository just consists of the 
certificate which it issued to other nodes and the 
certificates that other nodes issued to it. The certificate 
exchange mechanism is adapted to speed up the trust 
building process in the network. A node u broadcasts 
the IDs of the certificates stored in its repository to its 
neighboring nodes. When a neighboring node receives 
the IDs, it sends back the IDs of the certificates stored 
in its repository to node u. Node u compares the IDs of 
two sets of certificates and sends back the certificates, 
which it has but the neighboring node doesn’t have, to 
the corresponding neighboring node. This action is also 
done in the certificate renewal process (see below). 
When a node’s certificate repository can’t store any 
more certificates, the node deletes the older certificates 
according to their arrival time. Similar to the self-
organized scheme [4], each node has two kinds of 
repository: updated repository and non-updated 
repository. The certificates in the updated repository 
should be renewed periodically. The certificates in the 
non-updated repository just need to be renewed when 
the corresponding nodes can’t find a trust chain by 
merging the updated repository. 
 
2.3. Authentication of the new nodes 
 
When a new node w  wants to join the network, it 
broadcasts a query request message to its one-hop 
neighbors for finding authentication nodes. If there 
exist t authentication nodes which trust the node within 
its one-hop neighborhood, a valid system certificate 
can be generated with Lagrange interpolation. 
However, it is possible that a new node fails to find t 
authentication nodes in its one-hop neighborhood, 
especially when it lies in a sparse network. This is the 
main reason why the existing partially distributed 
authentication scheme doesn’t have high success ratio 
for authentication. 
If the node w can’t find t authentication nodes in 
its one-hop neighborhood to recover the system secret 
key SSK, then it tries to find enough paths to some 
authentication nodes beyond its one-hop neighborhood 
through trust transfer. The proposed hybrid 
authentication algorithm is shown in Fig.1. 
 
Fig. 1 The hybrid authentication algorithm 
New node w requests neighboring nodes randomly 
to find authentication nodes for it. The problem of 
finding enough authentication nodes is then delegated 
to some neighboring nodes, which are called the proxy 
nodes in the following. A proxy node accepts the 
request if it trusts the node. If a node, e.g. u, accepts the 
request, then it tries to find a certificate chain from 
itself to a certain authentication node. 
The certificate chain has the following features: 
(1) The first certificate on this path can be verified by 
node u.  
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(2) The last certificate binds the public key of the 
destination node, e.g. authentication node v in Fig 2. 
(3) Each certificate on the path, except for the first 
certificate, can be verified by the public key bound 
in the prior certificate. 
The finding process of trust chain between the two 
nodes is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Process of establishing trust chain 
The certificates on the path are then used by u to 
authenticate v. If node u finds an authentication node 
through the above mentioned trust transfer process, it 
can establish a secure channel from itself to the 
authentication node. Node u can send the partial key 
signed certificate directly to new node w, or can just 
send the public key of authentication node v to node w. 
If node u finds that it can’t find a trust chain to any 
authentication node, it also sends a message to inform 
node w. In this way, the authentication time can be 
reduced. After getting partial key signed certificate, 
new node w first validates the signature with verifiable 
secret sharing scheme (VSS) [9]. If the signature is 
valid, w reserves the certificate, and waits for the next 
partial signed certificate. When new node w gets t 
partial key signed certificates, it merges them to 
recover SSK, and joins the network successfully. After 
that, new node w informs neighboring nodes to stop 
finding authentication nodes. The CEF protocol [8] is 
also used to prevent the exposure of partial key in the 
certificate sign process. 
 
2.4. Certificate renewal 
 
Secret sharing alone can’t ensure security because 
it can’t defend against mobile adversary which 
compromises one authentication node for a limited 
time and then moves to the next node to do the same 
thing. Over time, a mobile adversary can compromise 
enough authentication nodes and then recover the SSK. 
Share refreshing is adapted to enhance security. 
Because new shares cannot be combined with old ones 
to recover the secret, a mobile adversary must 
compromise enough authentication nodes within the 
share refreshing period. This ensures security even in a 
more malicious environment. 
Each certificate of a node is bound with a valid 
time period. A node renews its certificate before it 
expires. Besides, the certificate also needs to be 
renewed when the corresponding node’s secret key is 
changed. The certificates in the network are renewed 
by the corresponding issuing node. Every node reserves 
its certificate issuing history. If a certificate will expire 
in the near future and the issuer believes that the node-
key bound in the certificate is still valid, the issuer 
issues a new edition of the certificate which bound a 
new valid time period and the same node-key relation. 
The renewal process of system certificate is 
similar to the authentication process, both of which 
need to get at least t partial key signed certificates and 
then merge the partial signed certificates to an valid 
system certificate. 
 
2.5. Certificate revocation 
 
There are two kinds of certificate revocation 
mechanisms: explicit revocation and implicit 
revocation. Explicit revocation means that the node-
key relationship should be released before the bound 
valid time expires due to some special reasons, for 
example, the issuer finds that the key bound in the 
certificate is leaked. Then the issuing node sends an 
explicit revocation notification to which it has issued 
this certificate. Implicit revocation means that the valid 
time of the certificate expires, but the issuing node 
doesn’t issue a new one. The issuing node usually 
renews the corresponding certificate before it expires, 
unless some misbehaviors of related nodes are detected 
 
3. Theoretical analysis and simulation 
studies 
 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our 
proposed scheme from different aspects including 
security and success ratio for authentication. We also 
compare the performance of our proposed scheme with 
existing distributed authentication schemes. 
 
3.1. Security analysis 
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Our scheme utilizes the CEF protocol [8] to 
achieve privacy in the process of secret merging. The 
real sign function is hidden by exponential switch as 
the information transferred in the network is 
transfiguration of partial key. Even though a mobile 
adversary collects t partial signed certificates during a 
share refreshing period, it’s infeasible to figure out 
SSK, which is equivalent to RSA plain text attack. The 
difficulty of discrete logarithm problem in Galois Field 
ensures the security of our scheme. Meanwhile, in 
order to prevent malicious node from issuing wrong 
partial signed certificate, verifiable secret sharing [9] is 
adapted. Once node w receives a partial signed 
certificate, it verifies the validity of partial key before 
adding them together to recover SSK. In this scenario, 
malicious node can’t disorder the recovering process. 
Wrong partial signed certificate can be detected as long 
as destination node gets it. It may be from a 
compromised node that is compromised by adversary 
or just a node that makes a mistake. Node w can 
directly discard the wrong certificate when it finds the 
certificate is invalid and then broadcast a signed state 
to notify the network about this authentication node’s 
misbehavior. 
In order to avoid adversary’s mobile attack, the 
homomorphic feature of partial key is utilized to renew 
secret share periodically. Before a mobile adversary 
does its best to capture t authentication nodes, the 
partial key has been renewed during this period of time, 
then the t partial keys can not be used to recover SSK 
any more due to their different editions. 
 
3.2. Success ratio for authentication 
 
The success ratio for authentication (or success 
ratio for short) is defined as: the ratio of the number of 
times of new nodes successfully joining the network to 
the total number of times for joining requests. 
In this paper, threshold secret sharing and the idea 
of trust transfer are combined to help finding 
authentication nodes through neighboring nodes. 
Certificate exchange scheme disseminates trust and 
enhances success ratio effectively. Chained 
authentication scheme can solve the authentication 
problem between any two nodes in the network, so it is 
integrated into our scheme.  
Given that (n, t) threshold scheme is adopted, we 
denote the communication range of normal node as r, S 
means the size of the network, and the max-hop of trust 
chain is set as h, where h is a system parameter that can 
be adjusted according to specific network environment. 
We assume authentication nodes move randomly in the 
network. Then, the success ratio of the distributed 
authentication scheme is obtained by: 
ini
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We can know from subsection 2.3 that the length 
of trust chain of node can reach h hops, including the 
link between new node and proxy node, so the success 
ratio of the hybrid authentication scheme can be 
represented as follows: 
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When r=200, S=5000m*5000m, Table 1 presents 
comparative results of the success ratio of distributed 
scheme and hybrid scheme under different numbers of 
authentication node and different threshold values. We 
also investigate the trend of success ratio when h is set 
as different values. 
Table 1 Comparison of Success Ratio for 
Authentication 
 t=3, 
n=500, 
n'=150 
t=3, 
n=1000, 
n'=300 
t=4, 
n=500, 
n'=150 
t=4, 
n=100, 
n'=300 
Rdcs 46.03% 79.56% 24.69% 65.75% 
Rhyb/h=2 58.24% 94.11% 35.60% 85.43% 
Rhyb/h=3 96.82% 99.99% 91.27% 99.94% 
 
In order to validate theoretical analysis of our 
scheme, we simulate the scheme with C++. We first 
investigate how the network scale and the max-hops of 
trust chain influence the success ratio for 
authentication. The mobility patterns of sensor nodes 
follow random way-point model. In the simulations, 
the number of authentication nodes is set as 200, and  
 
Fig. 3 Success Ratio vs. Network Scale when 
t=3, n=200, Mobility=10m/s 
the threshold value t=3. As shown in Fig.3, if the 
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trust chain’s max-hop reaches to 3 or more, the success 
ratio of our scheme is almost 100% even in sparse 
network. But the success ratio of distributed scheme 
decreases dramatically when the size of the network 
increases. Fig.3 indicates that our scheme is much more 
scalable than distributed scheme in terms of success 
ratio.  
The stability of our scheme is also demonstrated 
in Fig.4. We observe that when the value of max-hops 
is determined, the success ratio of hybrid scheme is 
insensitive to the threshold value. 
 
Fig. 4 Success Ratio vs. Number of Authentication 
nodes when h=3, s=5000, Mobility=10m/s 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper presents a hybrid authentication 
scheme which combines the threshold scheme and the 
mechanism of trust transfer in a seamless way. The 
proposed scheme utilizes the transfer of trust relations 
to find authentication nodes, and then improves the 
success ratio for authentication effectively. The 
theoretical analysis and simulation results show the 
usefulness of the proposed scheme in improving the 
scalability without sacrificing the security. The 
proposed scheme can be used in large-scale mobile ad 
hoc networks, while most existing authentication 
schemes can only be used in small or medium-scale 
mobile ad hoc networks. 
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